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ANIMAL CRUELTY LAWS AND 
FACTORY FARMING 
Joseph Vining* † 
Introduction 
“Should laws criminalizing animal abuse apply to animals raised for 
food?” The answer is yes, and yes especially because farm animals are gen-
erally now under the control of business corporations. State and federal 
criminal law have proved critical in modifying corporate policy and practice 
in other areas, a current example being worker safety. Criminal liability to-
day would include criminal liability of the corporate entity itself, and would 
thus also introduce the most effective regulation of individual handling of 
farm animals—regulation by the corporation, which has methods and re-
sources public agencies cannot match. 
We have a background public policy of humane treatment of sentient 
creatures, with a long history and sufficiently broadly sourced in enacted 
law to be called quasi-constitutional. Both state and federal courts fre-
quently refer to it as general public policy. The earliest criminal animal 
protection acts in Anglo-American law, in 1641 in Massachusetts and 1822 
in England, were directed specifically at the suffering of farm animals. But 
while protection of animals from cruelty was developing in the United 
States during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries into a basic public 
value, farm animals, with few exceptions, were being moved outside legal 
protection—either through their exemption from the definition of animals 
protected, or through the exemption of cruel practices in farming from the 
definition of cruel practices. At the same time, individual and family farm-
ing was being replaced by large-scale corporate processing organized along 
industrial lines. The result of this combination is a crisis of suffering in the 
United States, a crisis in the way there are crises of mass human suffering 
around the world today. 
I. The Necessity of Response to This Cruelty  
Through the Criminal Law 
The pressure for legal response is twofold. First, there is the claim of the 
suffering itself. We are centuries beyond the question whether farm animals’ 
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experience is suffering because they are not primates or human (whose suf-
fering is not questioned) but lambs, hogs, chickens, or cattle. Despite 
difficulty in quantifying suffering (the degree of it) and difficulty in aggre-
gating individual suffering (the amount of it), we do quantify and aggregate 
suffering. When we do, the degree and the amount of suffering of these 
animals—the numbers—are truly staggering. This suffering is seen against 
the background of laws that make the suffering of even a single animal at 
human hands sufficient to justify a felony conviction, and, startlingly, man-
datory psychiatric treatment in some jurisdictions. Humane treatment of an 
animal has been a value in itself for a very long time. It does its own work in 
the individual mind and the legal mind, not unlike the value of human life, 
indifference to which is the very definition of criminality.  
The second pressure comes directly from the pressure in the legal mind 
to make sense of things. Developments in one area of law always have rip-
ple effects beyond it because the legal mind is a mind and not a mechanism, 
and animal law is no exception. As each part of animal law is affected by a 
widening sense of animals as having intrinsic worth, even individuality, the 
law’s leaving virtually untouched this vast area of animal suffering at human 
hands is more and more anomalous. 
An effective response can really only come from the criminal law, be-
cause the source of so much of the suffering is the industrial processes 
designed and controlled by business corporations. The point of introducing 
or reintroducing the criminal law would not be the effectiveness of criminal 
sanctions versus civil sanctions or administrative remedies. The point indeed 
would not be “deterrence,” which brings with it its shadow of “overdeter-
rence.” The point is the introduction of the governing public value into the 
picture, at all, and taking account of the reality that animals are suffering at 
the hands of individual actors who are not free to make their own decisions. 
Individuals processing farm animals are in some sense victims themselves, 
operating within and subject to the administrative structure of the modern 
corporation that has its own ethos and internal sanctions. This latter fact 
means that a response that does not address the corporation will not be ef-
fective. But it also means that there is the possibility of effective regulation 
by the corporation itself. 
II. Crafting a Response Through Current Criminal Law
The current criminal cruelty statutes can be used to prevent animal cru-
elty. The statutes are often written in ways that suggest something like a 
cost-benefit analysis before criminality is perceived or found. Within the 
same statute, reference may be made on the one hand to torture, torment, 
mutilation, or cruelty, as such; and on the other hand to “unnecessary” or 
“unjustified” injury, pain, or suffering. But there are very few absolute val-
ues in law, not even the value of human life. What is protected by the 
absolute prohibition of torture, absolute in that there can be no justification 
or excuse for torture, may be such a value. But in general what a particular 
criminal law does is to require of those subject to it that they themselves 
2008] Animal Cruelty Laws 125 
 
internalize and respond in good faith to the value it protects. Internalized, 
the value has not so much a causal or systematic and predictable effect, but a 
very human effect in the mind, and, it does not go too far to say, the heart. 
Internalized, its effect is as far from in terrorem as can be: the value is a call, 
a claim, a challenge. Other values also call and claim—again, it is not abso-
lute. Realizing them all may not be possible. But what values do, including 
this one regarding animal suffering, is to fuel the imagination in the hope of 
realizing them all, in some way, at some time. And what any particular value 
also does, internalized, is to ground self-limitation when acting in a way that 
may injure the value. There is not a happy “justification” that allows untrou-
bled sleep when the immediate decision tips one way rather than another. 
There is always an element of tragic choice that leaves one alert, gives one 
pause, and keeps the imagination going. 
Life, bodily integrity, sexual dignity, privacy, worker safety, environ-
mental health, competitive markets, informed markets, animal welfare: the 
ways we describe what a criminal law is “about” range across the legal 
landscape. They have in common that they describe what a decision 
maker—minute to minute, day to day—cannot be indifferent to while decid-
ing what to do. Externalizing a concern of criminal law as what guides 
others but not oneself, ignoring it or calculating only the consequences to 
oneself of others’ actions guided by it, is the crime. In analysis that is the 
“thing of the mind,” the mens rea, without which there is no true crime—
civil liability perhaps, imposed to affect calculations and possibly insurable 
as a predictable risk, but not criminal liability.  
The fact that criminal liability is not about “rules” or “rule breaking” is 
nicely illustrated by the definition of murder often encountered in statutes, 
which includes causing death “under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life.” There is no rule there to be broken 
or disobeyed. A lawyer’s advice with respect to it can only be “do not be 
indifferent to the value,” respect its importance; and if you are not indiffer-
ent, if you really are trying to protect it, the law responding to a terrible 
situation in which you are involved will move from criminal to civil to regu-
latory and even away from any particular focus on you. The same will be 
true when the law of animal cruelty protects farm animals.  
III. The Corporate Context in Criminalizing
Cruelty to Farm Animals 
While farm animals were coming under the ownership or control of 
business corporations, there were two further developments that pointed to 
application of the criminal cruelty laws as the only effective response to the 
present situation. They were linked.  
One development was an increasing focus in the 1980s and 1990s on the 
criminal liability of organizations as such. It may not be generally recog-
nized how far modern criminal law is from analogies that have been made 
between corporate criminal responsibility and corporate civil responsibility 
in contract and tort through respondeat superior. Today the corporate person 
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is seen to be directly responsible to the criminal law. Its liability is not strict; 
its mens rea is not vicarious or “attributed” from an individual employee’s 
mens rea, but is its own, frequently different from any individual’s and often 
described as a form of criminal negligence or indifference. Recognizing this, 
new criminal remedies tailored to the corporate defendant emerged from the 
debates over the legislative reform of criminal sentencing that was being 
undertaken during the same period.  
The other development was an increasing emphasis in the economic lit-
erature and in business schools on pure profit-maximization as the criterion 
for guiding and judging decisions made on behalf of business corporations, 
whether for the long or the short term. This criterion has been debated 
among lawyers for decades and was in fact rejected in drafting the American 
Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance. But it has been picked 
up by a large part of the corporate bar, if not yet in any clear way by courts. 
Embodied in an individual human being, pure profit-maximization would be 
a sign of pathology. Embodied in a business corporation it has been pre-
sented as contributing to efficiency and fairness in business practice and 
financial markets. It differs from a “primarily profit” orientation in its 
mathematical rigor and in excluding explicitly the relevance of substantive 
values in corporate decision making, their allowable effect being solely in 
the form of quantifiable costs imposed from outside that might enter into 
corporate risk-management calculations. And the effort to redefine the legal 
term “business” in this way for business corporations is a true source of the 
degree of suffering of farm animals today.  
The new criminal remedies for corporations I note above were in part a 
response to the vulnerability of remedies that depended on fines. In pure 
profit-maximization corporations would do no more than enter fines into 
these risk-management calculations, discounted by probabilities drawn from 
the theory of games. The new sanctions were based explicitly on corporate 
culpability and culminated in supervised compliance programs, removal of 
recalcitrant individuals from positions of responsibility in a corporate hier-
archy, and ultimately judicial supervision of corporate management in a new 
form of “corporate probation.” Their clear purpose is to ensure that values 
protected by the criminal law, whatever they might be and however de-
scribed, are in fact entering as such into corporate decision making. 
Conclusion 
The deepening recognition of the sentience and suffering of farm ani-
mals has simply not yet led to turning and facing the consequences of 
animals’ ownership and processing as agricultural commodities by modern 
business corporations. We could not imagine the absolute control of human 
beings by people in organizations who thought it their duty to take no sub-
stantive value into account in what they did to them. Put the developments 
of the last several decades together—a shift of farm animals to the control of 
business corporations, professional thought that increasingly sees business 
corporations as value free except as the criminal law applies to them, and a 
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law of corporate criminality that is beginning to develop both substantive 
analysis and remedies appropriate to organizations—and the reintroduction 
of criminal cruelty laws into agriculture does not seem an extraordinary re-
sponse but the most natural one. Indeed, the maintenance and continuing 
evolution of the new corporate criminal sanctions would not be absolutely 
essential. The criminality of cruelty to farm animals would itself have suffi-
cient effect to warrant reintroduction. Criminalizing cruelty to farm animals 
would change what good faith decision making on behalf of a corporation 
would be, most especially in the design and internal administration of proc-
esses and practices. At the same time, it would delegitimize individuals’ 
orders and actions within the corporation that contribute to suffering. Fol-
lowing this, the specificity and flexibility of the modern corporation’s 
monitoring and reporting systems would make their special contribution to 
success in this area as in others. Far from being a last resort, criminalizing 
cruelty to farm animals should be the first step in confronting this crisis of 
suffering we as a society have allowed to happen. 
